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“A HORRIBLE FASCINATION”: SEGREGATION, 
OBSCENITY & THE CULTURAL CONTINGENCY 
OF RIGHTS 
ANDERS WALKER

 
ABSTRACT 
Building on current interest in the regulation of child pornography, 
this Article goes back to the 1950s, recovering a lost history of how 
southern segregationists used the battle against obscenity to counter the 
Supreme Court‘s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education. Focused on the 
psychological development of children, Brown sparked a discursive 
backlash in the South focused on claims that the races possessed different 
cultures and that white children would be harmed. This backlash joined a 
larger, regional campaign, a constitutional guerilla war mounted by 
moderates and extremists alike that swept onto cultural, First Amendment 
terrain even as the frontal assault of massive resistance succumbed to 
federal might. A radical re-reading of prevailing understandings of 
southern resistance to Brown, this Article posits that civil rights proved 
much more culturally contingent than scholars have so far recognized and 
reframes the manner in which we understand Brown, its progeny, and 
current constitutional debates over the relationship between rights and 
race.  
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INTRODUCTION 
During the summer of 1959, Virginia newspaper editor James Jackson 
Kilpatrick adopted the alias ―Billy Williams‖ and began purchasing large 
quantities of pornography through the mail.
1
 While Kilpatrick was himself 
a married father of three,
2
 Billy was ―a twenty-three-year-old bakery 
salesman, a high-school graduate, interested in dirty pictures, dirty movies, 
[and] sexy correspondence.‖3 Within weeks, Billy‘s inquiries led to a flood 
of obscene material, including an offer ―to buy action films from 
Copenhagen.‖4 Inspired, Kilpatrick generated a second fictive persona, 
―Joseph Rocco,‖ ―an effeminate, fruity sort of character, devoted to 
bondage pictures, male nudes . . . and the more delicate and bizarre forms 
of erotica.‖5  
Kilpatrick‘s pornographic personae marked a dramatic departure from 
the man that most Virginians knew him to be—a loyal supporter of arch-
conservative Senator Harry Flood Byrd and one of the South‘s foremost 
advocates of massive resistance to Brown v. Board of Education.
6
 Since 
1955—a year after the Supreme Court‘s landmark decision—Kilpatrick 
had used the editorial page of his newspaper, The Richmond News Leader, 
to criticize the ruling.
7
 In editorial after editorial, he blasted Brown as a 
violation of states‘ rights, celebrated Senator Byrd‘s call for ―massive 
resistance,‖ and even ―revived‖ an eighteenth-century theory of 
constitutional defiance known as ―interposition.‖8 The doctrine of 
interposition held that states could reject federal authority whenever they 
 
 
 1. JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SMUT PEDDLERS 3–4, 11 (1960). 
 2. Letter from James J. Kilpatrick to Pyke Johnson, Jr. (Jan. 20, 1958) (on file with Special 
Collections, University of Virginia). 
 3. KILPATRICK, supra note 1, at 11. 
 4. Id. at 4.  
 5. Id. at 11. 
 6. See JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION (1962); 
JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES: NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF VIRGINIA (1957) 
[hereinafter KILPATRICK, SOVEREIGN STATES]; Garrett Epps, The Littlest Rebel: James J. Kilpatrick 
and the Second Civil War, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 19 (1993).  
 7. NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE 
SOUTH DURING THE 1950‘S 109, 129 (1969); INTERPOSITION: EDITORIALS AND EDITORIAL PAGE 
PRESENTATIONS, THE RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, 1955–1956 (James Jackson Kilpatrick ed., 1956). 
 8. BARTLEY, supra note 7, at 129; DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC 
RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM CROW 168 (2004).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/2
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believed ―that authority violated the Constitution,‖ a notion rooted in 
Madisonian opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.
9
 By 1957, 
almost every southern state had adopted interposition as either official or 
symbolic policy, making Kilpatrick one of the single-most important 
architects of southern opposition to the Supreme Court.
10
  
How, if at all, did Williams and Rocco fit into this picture? Were there 
ties between Kilpatrick‘s views of Brown and his views of prominent 
1950s Supreme Court obscenity cases, such as Kingsley Books v. Brown 
and Roth v. United States?
11
 Or, was it mere coincidence that he began to 
develop fictive alter egos interested in pornography at the very same time 
that he led the South‘s legal charge against civil rights? A letter Kilpatrick 
penned on January 7, 1960, provides a clue. ―All this is now futile,‖ he 
began.
12
 Though ―the interposition movement of four years ago had great 
political value,‖ he continued, ―[y]ou know what has happened since then 
as well as I. The full power and weight of the Federal judiciary have been 
thrown into enforcement of the doctrines laid down generally in Brown v. 
Board of Education, and the impact of that decision no longer can be 
avoided.‖13 Rather than continue massive resistance, argued Kilpatrick, the 
South needed to follow the tactics employed by the repeal forces to end 
Prohibition, namely ―labor unceasingly to create a climate of opinion 
nationally in which the decision itself, if not actually reversed, will be 
effectively modified or controlled by acts of Congress.‖14 This called not 
for ―foolish and useless laws,‖ concluded Kilpatrick, but ―propaganda, 
publicity, and education.‖15 
Kilpatrick‘s plea for propaganda marked a new turn, one that helped 
explain his sudden interest in obscenity—a topic that he declared held a 
―horrible fascination‖ for him.16 As this Article will demonstrate, 
Kilpatrick wove threads of interposition into his 1960 book The Smut 
Peddlers, and used the battle against pornography to build a new coalition 
against the Supreme Court, this time under the rubric of upholding 
morality—itself a front for undermining civil rights. Rather than a 
 
 
 9. CHAPPELL, supra note 8, at 168. 
 10. BARTLEY, supra note 7, at 131; see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 390–91 (2004).  
 11. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957). 
 12. Letter from James J. Kilpatrick to Edward E. Lane (Jan. 7, 1960) (on file with Special 
Collections, University of Virginia).  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. KILPATRICK, supra note 1, at 289. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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quixotic, one-man quest, Kilpatrick‘s turn to prudence joined a larger, 
regional campaign, a constitutional guerilla war mounted by moderates 
and extremists alike that swept onto cultural, First Amendment terrain 
even as the frontal assault of massive resistance succumbed to federal 
might. Dubious moral regulations emerged across the region, southern 
officials declared the need to reinvigorate decency, and land bridges 
between the South and the nation began to surface, particularly as civil 
rights protest devolved into urban riots in 1965.  
Animating this shift was a pervading sense that the Civil Rights 
Movement had to be engaged on its own terms, not with violence or vitriol 
but moral rhetoric and aspirational politics. Just as movement leaders such 
as Martin Luther King, Jr., extolled black heroism and disciplined non-
violence, so too did segregationists like Kilpatrick feel compelled to 
celebrate the best of the white South: its civility, its manners, and its 
paternalist concern for African Americans whom, of course, 
segregationists then painted as illegitimate, immoral, and inept. If 
successful, Kilpatrick hoped to undermine the persuasive power of black 
leaders like King while winning national support for the struggle against 
Brown at the same time. However, accomplishing such a task involved 
delicate cultural politics. On the one hand, white officials aimed to 
delegitimate civil rights by increasing moral regulations of extramarital 
sex, common law marriage, and illegitimacy, essentially reframing black 
culture as pathological. On the other hand, they recast white southerners as 
morally principled arbiters of decency, a move reinforced by a sudden 
interest in the seemingly non-race related subject of pornography.  
To illustrate, this Article will proceed in five parts. Part I recovers the 
first signs of a cultural backlash to Brown in the South, showing how 
segregationists feared the ruling‘s effect on the indoctrination of racial 
prejudice in white youth, even as they seized on the opinion‘s social 
science evidence to forge a statistically constructed moralist response. Part 
II shows how said response bled onto legal terrain, sparking a web of 
regulations on marriage, adoption, and illegitimacy, all aimed at 
preserving segregation through coded, legislative means. Part III shows 
how segregationists applied these means to the national framework, 
looking to bridge southern interests with voters in both the North and 
West. The segregationists went so far as to posit amendments to the 
United States Constitution under the rubric of controlling pornography. 
Part IV reveals the manner in which such discursive moves intersected 
with the direct action phase of the Civil Rights Movement, prompting a 
series of exchanges between black activists and white segregationists on 
the explicitly cultural terrains of language, dress, and literature. Finally, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/2
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Part V recovers the constitutional implications of these intersections, first 
through victories against illegitimacy, and then a surprising right-hand 
turn on the Supreme Court.  
What lessons do we learn from such an inquiry? First, though legal 
historians have tended to portray southern resistance to Brown in terms of 
massive resistance,
17
 such readings only scratch the surface of 
segregationist strategy in the 1950s and 60s. Second, while southern 
historians like David Chappell argue that the white South failed to develop 
a Christian response to the prophetic religion of the Civil Rights 
Movement,
18
 a close look at segregationist turns to moral regulations 
indicates that segregationists did in fact assemble such a response, though 
not one articulated in prophetic terms. Rather than invoke prophetic 
religion, segregationists turned to a discourse of personal morality, one 
that proved particularly insidious precisely because it merged Puritanical 
notions of sexual sin with longstanding presumptions that the law should 
in fact be used to control such sin, even if no harm was involved.
19
 Even 
scholars who take segregationist religion seriously have missed this point 
with their argument that southern whites became preoccupied with 
―proclaiming the impending end of time and the irrelevance of life in the 
flesh.‖20  
Rather than consider life in the flesh irrelevant, segregationists worked 
hard to link Evangelical notions of personal purity with conservative fears 
of delinquency, pornography, and the corruption of minors more 
generally,
21
 laying the foundations for a discourse that would come to win 
popular support through the end of the twentieth century.
22
 Indeed, the 
significance of segregationist turns to personal morality lay precisely in 
 
 
 17. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 385–442. 
 18. See CHAPPELL, supra note 8, at 5.  
 19. Lord Devlin, Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 636 (1962) (calling for 
the use of law to regulate morality).  
 20. Jane Dailey, Sex, Segregation, and the Sacred after Brown, 91 J. AM. HIST. 119, 121 (2004). 
 21. See, e.g., Whitney Strub, Black and White and Banned All Over: Race, Censorship and 
Obscenity in Postwar Memphis, 40 J. SOC. HIST. 685, 703 (2007) [hereinafter Strub, Black and White] 
(showing how segregationists in Memphis turned to ―moralistic fervor‖ in the struggle against civil 
rights); Whitney Strub, Perversion for Profit: Citizens for Decent Literature and the Arousal of an 
Antiporn Public in the 1960s, 15 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 258, 260, 291 (2006) [hereinafter Strub, 
Perversion] (noting that ―[p]ornography remained central to the New Right‘s moral outrage‖ into the 
1980s). 
 22. See MARSHALL FRADY, BILLY GRAHAM: A PARABLE OF AMERICAN RIGHTEOUSNESS 
(Simon & Schuster 2006) (1979); CHRIS HEDGES, AMERICAN FASCISTS: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND 
THE WAR ON AMERICA (2006); THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: MARCHING TO THE 
MILLENNIUM (John C. Green et al. eds., 2003); TOWARD AN EVANGELICAL PUBLIC POLICY: 
POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR THE HEALTH OF THE NATION (Ronald J. Sider & Diane Knippers eds., 
2005).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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their ability to appeal across regional lines, transforming the struggle 
against Brown into a decidedly cultural crusade for the preservation of 
personal, moral values and Christian virtue. 
That obscenity became entangled in this project is worth noting. Even 
today, attitudes toward obscenity differ significantly based on whether the 
targets are children or adults. This phenomenon is exemplified in the 
current disconnect between prosecutions of minors for ―sexting‖ and the 
constitutional protection of adult-makers of ―crush‖ videos involving the 
torture of animals.
23
 Now, as then, prosecutions for pornography seem to 
be animated more by an interest in monitoring children than ending 
exploitation or cruelty, a concern that assumed a bizarrely sinister guise 
during the struggle for civil rights.  
Further, documenting segregationist moves to pornography broadens 
our understanding not simply of southern resistance to civil rights, but 
what scholars Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, Jack Balkin, Akhil Reed 
Amar, and Reva Siegel call the ―processes of constitutional decision-
making.‖24 Interested in the role that ―other political institutions‖ besides 
the Court play in constitutional interpretation, Brest et al. limit their 
discussion of segregationist reactions to Brown to ―The Southern 
Manifesto,‖ a document pledging that the South will use ―all lawful 
means‖ to combat the ruling.25 Missing, however, is any discussion of 
what those legal means were, how the segregationists aimed to curry 
popular opinion against the Court, and how they carried the constitutional 
struggle against racial equality onto explicitly cultural terrain—terrain that 
raises questions about the cultural contingency of rights generally in the 
United States. 
Put simply, the terrain of culture became a lost front in the struggle for 
racial equality at midcentury.
26
 The end of segregation, this Article will 
demonstrate, created fears across the South not simply of racial 
integration, but also fears of social, moral, and sexual disorder, 
particularly among youth. Public officials responded to such fears by 
pushing for increased legal regulation of both the public and private 
 
 
 23. Robert Barnes, Justices Overturn Anti-Animal-Cruelty Law in Free Speech Case, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 21, 2010, at A3; Tamar Lewin, Rethinking Sex Offender Laws for Youths Showing Off 
Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1; Kathleen Parker, Crush Animal Cruelty; The Next Step Is 
Up to Congress, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2010, at A21.  
 24. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (5th ed. 2006).  
 25. Id. at 902–04. 
 26. The idea that the realm of culture can be implicated in political struggle is nothing new. For 
an early exposition of the relationship between culture and political conflict, see ANTONIO GRAMSCI, 
PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Joseph A. Buttigieg ed., 1992).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] A HORRIBLE FASCINATION 1023 
 
 
 
 
spheres, including marriage, adoption, and illegitimacy. For 
segregationists like Kilpatrick, such regulations of culture promised a 
salve for social insecurities generated by Brown, even as they posed a 
potential threat to the cultural claims inherent in white supremacy. If the 
region pushed too far in the area of cultural control, feared Kilpatrick, it 
would risk appearing backward and philistine, undermining racist 
arguments that southern whites were culturally superior to blacks. Critical 
to the South‘s chances at preserving segregation, in other words, was 
carving out a constitutional and cultural defense of Jim Crow that voters 
across the country could endorse. Consequently, Kilpatrick became deeply 
involved not simply in the legal struggle over civil rights, but also a larger, 
literary struggle over the cultural implications of recognizing those rights.  
I. THE ‗UNPREJUDICED‘ MIND 
Long before James Jackson Kilpatrick shifted his attention from 
interposition to pornography, segregationist voices called for a moral 
crusade against civil rights. Among the first to do so was Mississippi 
Judge Thomas Pickens Brady.
27
 In a speech later distributed by 
segregationists across the South, Brady posited that desegregation would 
quickly lead to interracial sex.
28
 ―Constantly,‖ argued Brady, ―the [N]egro 
will be endeavoring to usurp every right and privilege which will lead to 
intermarriage.‖29 Such arguments, as historians have shown, were not only 
common in the post-Brown South but coincided with prohibitions against 
interracial marriage dating back at least two hundred years.
30
  
Yet, woven through Brady‘s intermarriage claim were strange threads, 
hints not simply that integration might encourage illicit sex, a common 
fear, but that integration might actually prevent children from developing 
 
 
 27. BARTLEY, supra note 7, at 85.  
 28. For the influence of Brady‘s speech on massive resistance, see id.  
 29. TOM P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY 65 (1955). 
 30. See PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING 
OF RACE IN AMERICA 19, 225–26 (2009) (discussing the history of miscegenation law and arguments 
that integration would lead to miscegenation in Mississippi); see also MARTHA HODES, WHITE 
WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (1997); KEVIN J. 
MUMFORD, INTERZONES: BLACK/WHITE SEX DISTRICTS IN CHICAGO AND NEW YORK IN THE EARLY 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1997); JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATTOES 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1980); Phoebe Godfrey, Bayonets, Brainwashing, and Bathrooms: The 
Discourse of Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Desegregation of Little Rock‘s Central High, 62 ARK. 
HIST. Q. 42 (2003); Martha Hodes, The Sexualization of Reconstruction Politics: White Women and 
Black Men in the South after the Civil War, 3 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 402 (1993); Julie Novkov, Racial 
Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890–1934, 20 L. & HIST. REV. 
225 (2002). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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race prejudice.
31
 Brady asserted, ―You cannot place little white and 
[N]egro children in classrooms and not have integration. They will grow 
up together and the sensitivity of the white children will be dulled.‖32 
Brady‘s mention of sensitivity indicated that racism was something that 
had to be inculcated in youth, a refinement of sorts that children did not 
naturally possess. Others agreed. Writing for the Atlantic in 1956, South 
Carolina journalist Herbert Ravenel Sass declared that ―the elementary 
public school‖ had to remain segregated ―at all costs‖ because white youth 
possessed ―unprejudiced‖ minds.33 ―[R]ace preference is not active in the 
very young,‖ warned Sass, but was rather ―one of those instincts which 
develop gradually as the mind develops and which, if taken in hand early 
enough, can be prevented from developing at all.‖34  
Not all segregationists framed their fear of integration in terms of 
eroding prejudice. Some spoke of harm. ―I submit that white children also 
have rights,‖ proclaimed Mississippi Senator James Eastland only weeks 
after Brown was handed down.
35
 ―[T]ensions and frictions generally found 
in an interracial school,‖ continued Senator Eastland, ―certainly will have 
a bad effect on a white child, and in my judgment will interfere with the 
white child‘s ability to learn.‖36 South Carolina journalist William D. 
Workman echoed Senator Eastland‘s concerns in a book defending Jim 
Crow:  
[T]he integrationists, who cry for racial admixture in the cause of 
bolstering the personality development of a Negro minority, do not 
hesitate to compel the mingling of a white minority with a black 
majority without any consideration of the inevitable psychological 
 
 
 31. Scholars of children in the South have not recognized the extent to which even staunch 
segregationists like Brady realized race prejudice was artificially inculcated in youth. See, e.g., 
REBECCA DE SCHWEINITZ, IF WE COULD CHANGE THE WORLD: YOUNG PEOPLE AND AMERICA‘S 
LONG STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2009). Notions that white children had to be educated on the 
ideology of race were nothing new. Colonial elites in places as distant as British South Africa and the 
Dutch East Indies struggled incessantly with the challenge of European children abandoning European 
ways. This concern lead to entire discourses on the proper training, or education, of white youth, 
discourses that prefigured white concerns in the American South during the 1950s. See ANN LAURA 
STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE: FOUCAULT‘S HISTORY OF SEXUALITY AND THE 
COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS 105 (1995); Ann Laura Stoler, Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: 
European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia, in TENSIONS OF 
EMPIRE: COLONIAL CULTURES IN A BOURGEOIS WORLD 198, 215 (Frederick Cooper & Ann Laura 
Stoler eds., 1997).  
 32. BRADY, supra note 29, at 65.  
 33. Herbert Ravenel Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood, ATLANTIC, Nov. 1956, at 48. 
 34. Id.  
 35. 100 CONG. REC. 11,523 (1954) (statement of Sen. James Eastland). 
 36. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/2
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impact upon the personalities of the white children. Indeed, there 
has been a monumental indifference on the part of the race-mixers 
concerning the likelihood of adverse psychological effects upon 
white children.
37
 
Exacerbating southern interest in ―psychological effects‖ was Brown‘s 
citation of social science data to establish that segregated schools violated 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not simply 
because schools were unequal, but because racial separation per se 
inflicted psychological harm on black youth.
38
 Georgia Attorney General 
Eugene Cook lamented the fact that, in his view, ―the justices based their 
decision not upon any premise or tenet of law but solely upon sociological 
and psychological theories.‖39 South Carolina Senator Olin D. Johnston 
agreed, noting that when he ―became a United States Senator [he] took an 
oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States‖ but that 
this oath did not include supporting ―sociological pronouncements of a 
Supreme Court‖ that replaced law with arbitrary ―judicial dictatorship.‖40 
Outrage at the Court‘s reliance on social science data convinced some 
segregationists, including James Jackson Kilpatrick, that outright defiance 
or ―massive resistance‖ to the Court was the South‘s best hope. Such a 
belief prompted Kilpatrick to launch a legal campaign of ―interposition‖ 
from his desk in Richmond.
41
 First devised by Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison in response to the oppressive Alien and Sedition Acts of 
1798, the doctrine of interposition held that it was ―the unquestionable 
right‖ of individual states to resist unconstitutional federal action.42 
Though not quite as dramatic as armed revolt, the theory nevertheless held 
that states could interpose their will against the Supreme Court, a 
proposition that flirted with outright rejection of the federal government. 
 
 
 37. WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR THE SOUTH 241 (1960) (emphasis omitted).  
 38. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). Even northern sources 
commented on the Court‘s reliance on social psychology. See James Reston, A Sociological Decision: 
Court Founded Its Segregation Ruling On Hearts and Minds Rather Than Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
1954, at 14-L (―Relying more on the social scientists than on legal precedents—a procedure often in 
controversy in the past—the court insisted on equality of the mind and heart rather than on equal 
school facilities. . . . The court‘s opinion read more like an expert paper on sociology than a Supreme 
Court opinion. It sustained the argument of experts in education, sociology, psychology, psychiatry 
and anthropology . . . .‖). See generally DARYL MICHAEL SCOTT, CONTEMPT & PITY: SOCIAL POLICY 
AND THE IMAGE OF THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880–1996 (1997).  
 39. Eugene Cook, Att‘y Gen. of Ga., The Southern View of Segregation, An Address Before the 
Conservative Society of the Yale Law School (Dec. 8, 1955) (on file with author). 
 40. Centralization Hit by SC Solons: Lawmakers Issue Warnings In Both Senate, House, THE 
STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 2, 1956, at 1-D. 
 41. BARTLEY, supra note 7, at 126–49.  
 42. See Kentucky-Virginia Resolutions, RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Nov. 21, 1955, at 10. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Yet, Kilpatrick viewed it—at the time—to be a genteel means of refuting 
Brown.
43
 Indeed, to his mind, interposition represented a bridge issue, a 
non-objectionable concept that the South might use to relate to the rest of 
the country, perhaps even currying national favor. For example, in 1957, 
Kilpatrick argued that 
the fate of the schools, or the fate of the resisting Southern states, is 
not the most vital issue here at bar. Far transcending any question of 
race or instruction, is the greater conflict over the stability of the 
Constitution. . . . If States outside the South are to comprehend the 
peril before them, they would do well to look beyond the frontal 
fight of Brown v. Board of Education to the flanking decisions in 
which State powers also are being steadily destroyed.
44
  
Kilpatrick went on to discuss a series of ―flanking‖ cases, all decided by 
the Supreme Court that increased the power of the federal government 
over the states. Among them were United States v. California and United 
States v. Louisiana, both declaring the federal government sole owner of 
―the land, minerals and other things of value‖ off the coasts of California 
and Louisiana.
45
 Also indicative of federal creep were Garner v. 
Teamsters Local Union No. 776, which dismissed state remedies for labor 
disputes, and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, which overturned state convictions 
of suspected communists.
46
 Such rulings, argued Kilpatrick, represented a 
frightening campaign by the federal government to rob the states of their 
sovereignty. Protecting that sovereignty, not preserving white supremacy, 
constituted the South‘s ultimate reason for rejecting the Supreme Court.  
 
 
 43. KILPATRICK, SOVEREIGN STATES, supra note 6, at 77, 86–98, 178–79, 186–99. In 1956, 
Kilpatrick wrote that ―[t]he Supreme Court can be resisted in a dozen lawful ways. Its despotic 
usurpation of power can be fought judicially, politically, legislatively. Without compromising 
principle, without bowing to the court‘s unwarranted mandates, the South can yet win.‖ Fringes of the 
Storm, RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Sept. 5, 1956, at 10.  
 44. KILPATRICK, SOVEREIGN STATES, supra note 6, at 286–87. 
 45. Id. at 287–92 (discussing United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. 
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950)). 
 46. Id. at 292–96 (discussing Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); 
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956)). That Brown might be successfully opposed was 
perhaps not as farfetched as it seemed. After all, in his seminal article Decision-Making in a 
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, Robert Dahl argued that the Supreme 
Court operates as a policy-making institution within the larger American political system. However, 
because ―the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views 
dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States,‖ the Court should not be expected to 
―long hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.‖ Robert 
A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. 
L. 279, 285, 291 (1957). 
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Impressed, segregationists across the South adopted interposition as 
either official or symbolic policy, making it a pronounced component of 
the larger campaign of massive resistance to Brown.
47
 Yet, interposition 
was not the only strategy pursued by southern states.
48
 Across the South, 
moderates proclaimed that Brown could be circumvented through other, 
more subtle means.
49
 In Florida, Governor LeRoy Collins warned that 
pursuing a course of ―hot words‖ would only jeopardize the South‘s 
position, and that ―smart lawyers‖ could find ―lawful and peaceful‖ means 
to circumvent the ruling.
50
 Mississippi Governor J. P. Coleman agreed, 
warning that ―[w]e can‘t preserve segregation by defying the federal 
government,‖ but rather, the South needed to employ ―legal means‖ to 
subvert the decision.
51
  
What kind of means? Coleman developed a model for circumventing 
Brown that focused on removing all mention of race from southern state 
law while using coded signifiers to assign students to schools.
52
 Coleman 
developed his plan, known as ―pupil placement,‖ while listening to oral 
arguments in Brown.
53
 The strategy hinged on using social science 
evidence, particularly illegitimacy rates, to assign students to schools 
based on sociological factors, such as moral character, intelligence, family 
background, and public health, rather than race.
54
 As the next Part will 
show, moral regulations, of which pupil placement plans were one 
example, spread across the South, sparking a wave of related, moral 
regulations aimed at preserving Jim Crow.  
II. MORAL REGULATIONS 
Coleman‘s endorsement of pupil placement as a ―legal means‖ of 
circumventing Brown marked a distinctly different form of resistance than 
constitutional defiance, or interposition, a strategy that quickly implicated 
other laws. For example, in 1956 Coleman signed a bill into law that 
 
 
 47. BARTLEY, supra note 7, at 126–49.  
 48. For other strategies, including the centralization of law enforcement to undermine direct 
action protest, see ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS (2009).  
 49. Id. at 88–89. 
 50. Id.; Interview by Jack Bass and Walter De Vries with LeRoy Collins in Tallahassee, Fla. 12 
(May 19, 1974) (on file with Southern Oral History Program Collection, University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill). 
 51. WALKER, supra note 48, at 12. 
 52. Id. at 39–43. 
 53. Id. at 39.  
 54. Id. at 40. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1028 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:1017 
 
 
 
 
abolished common law marriage. Coleman hoped to boost black 
illegitimacy rates and ―aid segregation by permitting the state to segregate 
on a basis of ‗unfavorable moral background‘ instead of on a basis of 
race.‖55 The ―theory of the bill,‖ reported the Baton Rouge Morning 
Advocate, ―was to set up unfavorable moral background as a basis for 
segregation,‖ a background measured entirely by focusing on illegitimacy 
rates.
56
 Of course, in citing such rates segregationists did not bother to 
mention whether the rates may have been artificially suppressed in white 
communities through either abortions or adoptions. Adoptions were 
facilitated by whites-only maternity homes,
57
 and according to the Virginia 
League of Local Welfare Executives, abortions were handled ―by the girls 
themselves or their families with no call on the taxpayers.‖58 The 10 
percent of pregnancies that befell women on welfare, consequently, were 
―the ones that produce the cries of alarm,‖ and those pregnancies tended—
due to Jim Crow‘s devastating impact on education, economic 
opportunity, and political power—to be black.59 
Yet, segregationists turned a blind eye to adoptions and abortions in 
white communities. Instead, they preferred to argue that ―[s]outhern 
whites are the only people in America who can testify to . . . the low moral 
level of the Colored in marriage relationships.‖60 According to the Virginia 
Methodist Advocate, opposition to integration could be explained by the 
―different moral standards‖ between the races, standards reflected in 
―illegitimate births.‖61 A Mississippi newspaper agreed, reporting that 
―[n]ot more than 20 per cent of the Negroes are married.‖62 The newspaper 
further noted that ―[i]f you will pick out ten Negro families and check the 
records, you will find that not over two of them are actually legitimately 
married.‖63  
 
 
 55. Common Law Marriage Ban Sent to Coleman, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Apr. 1, 
1956, at 1. 
 56. Legislators in Mississippi End Session, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Apr. 1, 1956, at 
10-D.  
 57. WALKER, supra note 48, at 80–81. 
 58. Celestine Sibley, Sex Hoopla, Not Funds, Is Illegitimacy Cause, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 15, 
1960, at 16. Furthermore, about twelve percent of all pregnancies in the South ended in abortion, but 
were never discovered. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. LOUIS E. DAILEY, THE SIN OR EVILS OF INTEGRATION 39 (1962).  
 61. 85 CONG. REC. A6455 (appendix July 18, 1958) (extension of remarks of Rep. Watkins M. 
Abbitt). 
 62. J.A. Thigpen, Thigpen Report Shows Less Than A Fifth Negro Parents Are Wed, DELTA 
DEMOCRAT-TIMES (Greenville, Miss.), Nov. 17, 1955, at 13. 
 63. Id.  
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The emphasis on marriage rates as a justification for segregation, 
together with the use of marriage or extra-marital motherhood as a means 
of perpetuating it, helps to explain a wave of laws enacted across the 
South in the 1950s that made marriage licenses increasingly difficult to 
obtain. To take just a few examples, Mississippi enacted several bills in 
1956 ―designed to throw up a bulwark around the state‘s segregation 
laws.‖64 One such bill banned common law marriage.65 Further, another 
bill required that all marriage licenses provide information on the 
applicants, including their race, number of past marriages, and manner of 
termination of past marriages, and that all data collected from the 
applicants be sent to the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State Board of 
Health for tabulation.
66
 That same year, Georgia declared that marriage 
licenses could only be granted by the registrar, or his clerk, at the county 
courthouse, between the hours of 8:00 A.M. and 12:00 P.M.
67
 As an 
accommodation to working people, the act declared that the clerk could 
also grant licenses at his personal residence,
68
 no doubt a provision that 
catered to whites, who were undoubtedly more comfortable approaching 
white homes after hours than African Americans. One year later, Georgia 
further complicated the process of obtaining a marriage license by 
removing the presumption that previous marriages had been dissolved 
when an individual applied for a marriage license.
69
 Instead, the applicant 
carried the burden of proving that any prior marriages had been 
legitimately dissolved via divorce.
70
 For those in a common law marriage, 
such a measure made the prospect of remarrying significantly harder, if 
not impossible.  
In 1957, North Carolina required that all newborns be registered within 
five days of birth with the Office of Vital Statistics and that a birth 
certificate be obtained for each child.
71
 Further, information regarding the 
marital status of parents was to be included on each birth certificate, and 
each certificate was then to be sent to the Office of Vital Statistics, 
presumably for tabulation purposes.
72
 The significance of birth certificates 
 
 
 64. Legislators in Mississippi End Session, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Apr. 1, 1956, at 
10-D. 
 65. Act of Apr. 5, 1956, ch. 239, 1956 Miss. Laws 289. 
 66. Act of Mar. 22, 1956, ch. 302, 1956 Miss. Laws 399. 
 67. Act of Feb. 14, 1956, No. 37, 1956 Ga. Laws 43. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Act of Feb. 22, 1957, No. 85, 1957 Ga. Laws 83.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Act of June 12, 1957, ch. 1357, 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws 1478.  
 72. Id. 
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assumed an even more pronounced role in Arkansas, where ―no child‖ was 
―admitted to the first grade of any public school of the state until the 
parent, guardian, or some other responsible person has presented to the 
proper school authorities such child‘s birth certificate.‖73 Louisiana passed 
a similar rule, holding that ―all children, upon entering the first grade of 
any school in the State of Louisiana shall be required to present a copy of 
their official birth record to the school principal.‖74 Louisiana later passed 
a law that required individuals applying for a marriage license to present 
certified copies of their original birth certificates.
75
 
Though such regulations coincided with a larger effort to document 
differences in ―moral background‖ between the races, questions emerged 
about how, precisely, whites were to escape such statistical nets. This 
became apparent in North Carolina in 1959, when two state legislators 
proposed a bill granting district attorneys the power to prosecute unwed 
mothers for child abandonment. According to the proposal, district 
attorneys would be provided with lists of illegitimate births and would be 
required to investigate the parents responsible for such births.
76
 District 
attorneys would also receive lists of public welfare grant recipients and be 
required to investigate them for similar violations.
77
 If the prosecutors 
happened to find that unwed parents were misusing funds, they could 
charge them with a misdemeanor.
78
 
Immediately, cries emerged from North Carolina‘s white community, 
particularly the portion of the community that dealt with white 
adoptions.
79
 On May 12, 1959, for example, Galt Braxton, a member of 
the Board of Trustees of the Children‘s Home Society of North Carolina 
of Greensboro, wrote to the chair of the House Health Committee 
complaining that the bill made for bad policy.
80
 In particular, he 
complained of the requirement that prosecutors be supplied with the 
names and addresses of illegitimate children and their unwed mothers. 
 
 
 73. Act of Mar. 3, 1959, No. 139, 1959 Ark. Acts 382.  
 74. Act of July 8, 1954, No. 573, 1954 La. Acts 1061.  
 75. Act of July 1, 1958, No. 160, 1958 La. Acts 609. The statute also required applicants to 
present medical documents dated within ten days of the license application asserting that they did not 
carry a venereal disease. Id. Evidence that these requirements made it significantly harder to acquire a 
marriage license emerged in an attorney general‘s opinion in 1958. See 1958 Op. La. Att‘y Gen. 25, 26 
(describing alternative routes that could be taken for those who did not have birth certificates). 
 76. Davis-Jolly Morals Bill Is Discarded, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Apr. 22, 1959, at 1.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Sterilized Illegitimacy Bill Okayed, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), May 30, 1959, at 3.  
 79. Davis-Jolly Substitute Is Opposed, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), May 7, 1959, at 10.  
 80. Letter from H. Galt Braxton to Carl Venters (May 12, 1959) (on file with North Carolina 
State Archives); see WALKER, supra note 48, at 80. 
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―Such a law,‖ argued Braxton in an editorial for the Kinston Daily Free 
Press, would ―brand‖ every ―innocent child born in North Carolina out of 
wedlock as illegitimate.‖81 Rather than reduce illegitimacy rates, this 
―would defeat efforts that have been in progress for more than half a 
century to save such innocent youngsters by placing them in reputable and 
proper homes.‖82 Not only that, the bill ―would brand every young woman 
in the State who unfortunately becomes an unwed mother and would put 
up the bars permanently for such a girl or young woman to be redeemed to 
society and thereafter live a life worthwhile.‖83 
Given that North Carolina boasted few maternity homes for blacks, 
Braxton‘s message clearly aimed to alert the legislature to possible harm 
the bill might cause whites.
84
 Further, Braxton‘s concern that whites be 
―redeemed‖ from their premarital affairs underscores the extent to which 
southern invocations of morality proved only a partial substitute for color 
as a basis for discrimination. Yet, this did not stop states from continuing 
the project of using moral signifiers as vehicles for furthering repression. 
To take just a few of the most outrageous examples, in 1958 Georgia 
passed a voter registration act that enabled voters to register in two 
different ways.
85
 Either they could read and write intelligibly a section of 
the state or national constitution, or they could exhibit good character and 
an understanding of the duties of citizenship by responding to a set of 
questions.
86
 Due to persistent illiteracy caused by Jim Crow, most black 
applicants chose to answer the questions despite the fact that the majority 
of them were ultimately disqualified for not answering the questions 
correctly.
87
 Florida writer Stetson Kennedy commented on these 
disqualifications, noting that arbitrary determinations of moral character 
were often involved:  
The purge procedure as evolved by Georgia is simplicity itself. You 
receive a legal summons to appear before the county board of 
registrars at a specified time . . . to ―show cause‖ why your name 
should not be dropped because of ―bad character‖ . . . . If you fail to 
 
 
 81. H. Galt Braxton, Such Legislation Would Be a Black Mark, KINSTON DAILY FREE PRESS, 
May 11, 1959, at 1. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING THE RACE CARD 
AGAINST AMERICA‘S POOR 71 (2001).  
 85. Voters‘ Registration Act, No. 321, 1958 Ga. Laws 269.  
 86. Id. at 278. 
 87. Georgians Stick with State Law on Negro Voting, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Mar. 1, 
1960, at 4-A. 
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appear, your name is automatically stricken; if you do appear, it is 
usually stricken just the same.
88
  
Mississippi followed a similar pattern, also looking to moral character as 
grounds for rejecting applications to vote. This became apparent in 1960, 
when Mississippi state representative Thompson McClellan introduced a 
resolution requiring that voters be ―of good moral character‖ in order to 
register.
89
 The Senate adopted the measure on April 28, 1960, and the 
House followed a few days later.
90
  
Meanwhile, the Louisiana legislature submitted two constitutional 
amendments to a statewide referendum limiting voting rights to those who 
could establish good moral character.
91
 According to the statute, those who 
had ―lived with another in ‗common law‘ marriage within five years from 
the date of making application to become an elector,‖ and those who had 
―given birth to an illegitimate child within the five years immediately prior 
to the date of making application for registration as an elector‖ did not 
possess good character.
92
 The amendments, which were passed on 
November 8, 1960, empowered county registrars to determine whether 
individuals were either in common law marriages or had illegitimate 
children.
93
 
Not satisfied, Louisiana then punished unwed mothers by denying them 
welfare benefits. In 1960, the state passed a bill denying welfare benefits 
to an illegitimate child ―if the mother of the illegitimate child in question 
is the mother of two or more older illegitimate children.‖94 Then, the 
legislature enacted another statute denying public assistance ―to any 
person who is living with his or her mother if the mother has had an 
illegitimate child after a check has been received from the welfare 
department.‖95 Almost immediately, the new measures ―removed over a 
quarter of Louisiana‘s . . . recipients from the state‘s welfare rolls by 
 
 
 88. STETSON KENNEDY, JIM CROW GUIDE TO THE U.S.A.: THE LAWS, CUSTOMS AND ETIQUETTE 
GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF NONWHITES AND OTHER MINORITIES AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS 157 
(Univ. of Ala. Press 2011) (1959).  
 89. Plan to Limit Negro Voters in Mississippi, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Apr. 4, 1960, 
at 11-A. 
 90. See Act of May 5, 1960, Concurrent Resolution, 1960 Miss. Laws 886, 886. The requirement 
that voters be ―of good moral character‖ was written into the state constitution two years later. See Act 
of May 23, 1962, 1962 Miss. Laws 1011, 1012. 
 91. No. 613, 1960 La. Acts 1166 (constitutional amendment).  
 92. Id. at 1167. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Act of July 7, 1960, No. 306, 1960 La. Acts 634.  
 95. Act of July 7, 1960, No. 251, 1960 La. Acts 525.  
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eliminating the eligibility of 6,000 families with 22,500 children—95 
percent of whom were African American.‖96 
Florida engaged in a similar program. Citing ―the pressing problem of 
illegitimacy,‖ Governor LeRoy Collins recommended that welfare be cut 
to children living in unsuitable homes.
97
 A home‘s suitability was 
determined by a set of vague criteria, each one capable of disqualifying the 
recipient.
98
 For example, if children were left alone while their parents 
engaged in ―social activities or undesirable pursuits,‖ then the parents 
could lose welfare benefits.
99
 Also, if parents engaged in promiscuous 
conduct ―either in or outside the home‖ or had an illegitimate child after 
receiving an assistance payment, they could lose support.
100
 Of the 14,664 
reports on unsuitable homes that were filed because of the 1959 
restrictions, 91 percent of these reports were filed against black families, 
with the end result that 7,000 families and nearly 30,000 children lost 
welfare funding.
101
 
Though draconian, welfare cuts in Florida and Louisiana epitomized a 
larger shift in southern law away from express references to color and 
towards more subtle, manufactured notions of racial character, even 
culture. North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges admitted as much during 
a televised address on August 8, 1955, when he asserted that African 
Americans possessed a ―new and rapidly developing culture,‖ while 
whites retained an ―older culture‖ that was at risk of destruction under 
integrated conditions.
102
 ―[U]nless we can, through good will and pride in 
the integrity of our respective racial cultures,‖ argued Hodges, ―separate 
schools voluntarily,‖ then much of the progress made by both cultures 
would be ―undone.‖103 Though Hodges did not define what, precisely, he 
meant by culture, his words reverberated with claims made by other, more 
extreme segregationists. To take just a few examples, James Jackson 
Kilpatrick agreed that integration would lead to ―the decline of the only 
culture we know,‖104 while Judge Thomas Pickens Brady warned that 
 
 
 96. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 84, at 71.  
 97. WALKER, supra note 48, at 111–12.  
 98. Act of May 29, 1959, chap. 59-202, 1959 Fla. Laws 376. 
 99. Id. at 377. 
 100. Id. 
 101. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF 
PUBLIC WELFARE 139–40 (2d ed. 1993).  
 102. Luther H. Hodges, Address By Governor Luther H. Hodges of North Carolina on State-Wide 
Radio-Television Network (Aug. 8, 1955) (on file with North Carolina State Archives). 
 103. Id.  
 104. Letter from James J. Kilpatrick to William H. Heath (July 26, 1957) (on file with Special 
Collections, University of Virginia). 
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wherever integration was attempted, ―the white man, his intellect and his 
culture have died.‖105 Such recurring allusions to culture help explain the 
region-wide emphasis on illegitimacy rates, statistical indicators of sexual 
behavior that segregationists used—even manipulated—to prove that race 
was not simply a matter of cosmetic difference.
106
 Rather, race could be 
measured, they argued, by looking at collective sexual behavior. What 
they wanted to assert was in fact customary behavior, or culture, thereby 
generating a color-neutral, moralist discourse that animated—and was 
animated by—state law. As the next Part will illustrate, segregationists 
carried this discourse to the national stage, hoping to build bridges 
between the South and the rest of the nation.  
III. SOCIOLOGICAL WARFARE 
Even as southern states enacted increasingly racially coded moral 
regulations to preserve Jim Crow, so too did segregationists cobble 
together a moralist campaign aimed at stirring resentment to integration 
nationally.
107
 Animating this campaign was a conviction that the South‘s 
fate hinged on pitching reasonable arguments to the ―unprejudiced‖ minds 
of enough voters in the North and West that Brown might be ―effectively 
modified or controlled by acts of Congress.‖108 As one of the attorneys for 
South Carolina who argued against the NAACP in Brown put it, ―[o]ur 
only hope at present lies not in the carrying on of the battle in the courts,‖ 
but rather, in taking ―the battle to the people and using the same 
psychological and sociological warfare that has been so successfully 
carried on against us.‖109  
One place where segregationists hoped to take the battle to the people, 
or at least their representatives, was Congress. There, prominent Senators 
 
 
 105. BRADY, supra note 29, at 7. 
 106. Connections between race and culture were nothing new, though segregationists seemed to 
recover discourses prominent at the turn of the twentieth century, while remaining blind to more 
critical work done by scholars like Franz Boas and Robert Ezra Park in the 1940s and 50s. See, e.g., 
FRANZ BOAS, RACE, LANGUAGE AND CULTURE (1940); A.G. KELLER, REMINISCENCES (MAINLY 
PERSONAL) OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER (1933); ROBERT EZRA PARK, RACE AND CULTURE (1950); 
Floyd N. House, Some Methods of Studying Race and Culture, 15 SOC. FORCES 1 (1936); J.R. Kantor, 
Anthropology, Race, Psychology, and Culture, 27 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 267 (1925); Wilson D. 
Wallis, Race and Culture, 23 SCI. MONTHLY 313 (1926). 
 107. Anders Walker, Blackboard Jungle: Delinquency, Desegregation, and the Cultural Politics 
of Brown, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1927–36 (2010).  
 108. Letter from James J. Kilpatrick to Edward E. Lane (Jan. 7, 1960) (on file with Special 
Collections, University of Virginia). 
 109. Rogers Gives Views on Segregation Fight, NEWS & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 23, 
1955, at 1-B. 
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like Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland declared that southerners had 
―to go into the north, and carry the fight into every section of the United 
States.‖110 ―What divides the two areas of our country,‖ posited Eastland, 
was ―that in each area the people think that those in the other area do not 
think as they do, when in reality we all think alike . . . .‖111 To Eastland‘s 
mind, all Americans possessed trepidation about racial integration, and—
though few would openly endorse racism—most could be persuaded to 
curtail the Supreme Court. In fact, Eastland proposed an amendment to the 
Constitution in 1954 providing that ―there shall be preserved to the States 
full control of health, education, marriage, and good order within a 
State.‖112 
Though few joined Eastland‘s amendment, other prominent southerners 
echoed his national appeal. To take just one example, Georgia Senator 
Herman Talmadge took the very same arguments about illegitimacy that 
had been stalking southern legislatures since 1954 to the nation in 1959. 
On September 1, 1959, Talmadge declared that the ―mounting rate of 
illegitimacy‖ in America was approaching a ―national disgrace.‖113 
Carefully tracking southern efforts to cut welfare benefits to illegitimate 
children, Talmadge ―proposed that the Senate Committee on Finance . . . 
undertake a thorough study of the relationship between the alarming 
increase in illegitimacy and Federal policies governing welfare assistance 
to dependent children.‖114 He then entered statistics into the Congressional 
Record, documenting expenditures on illegitimate children by the federal 
government nationwide, including breakdowns of those expenditures by 
race.
115
 
Even as Eastland and Talmadge waged moral wars in the Senate, so too 
did southerners wage ―sociological warfare‖ in the House. To take just one 
example, Mississippi Representative John Bell Williams mounted a 
vigorous campaign in 1956 to sway popular opinion against integration by 
focusing on crime statistics. For example, Williams entered into the 
Congressional Record evidence indicating that African Americans 
committed five times as many murders as whites in Washington, D.C. and 
seven times as many rapes.
116
 Though such numbers may have been 
inflated due to demographic shifts like white flight, not to mention 
 
 
 110. 100 CONG. REC. 11,523 (1954) (statement of Sen. James Eastland).  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 105 CONG. REC. 17,475 (1959) (statement of Sen. Herman Talmadge).  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 102 CONG. REC. 5,692 (1956) (statement of Rep. John Bell Williams). 
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reporting bias, Williams glossed over scientific explanations for his 
supposedly scientific data, preferring instead to make broad claims about 
black inferiority. For example, he cited Federal Bureau of Prisons data to 
argue that even though African Americans comprised only 10 percent of 
the population in the United States in 1950, they committed ―more than 
half the homicides, both murder and manslaughter, in our country‖ that 
year.
117
 Of course, Williams failed to mention that crimes committed by 
whites, particularly crimes committed by whites in the South, tended to go 
unpunished as evidenced by the murder of black teenager Emmett Till in 
his own state of Mississippi only a year before.
118
 
Desperate to shift popular attention away from the murderous 
tendencies of his own people, Williams organized a study of integrated 
conditions in Washington, D.C. schools, hoping to generate more statistics 
on black inferiority. Using his position on a subcommittee of the House 
Committee on the District of Columbia dedicated to investigating 
delinquency in D.C. schools, Williams enlisted the support of three white 
southern congressmen to generate a report that grossly exaggerated 
problems related to integration.
119
 For example, Williams began by 
claiming that there were ―very few unusual disciplinary problems in 
either‖ black or white schools prior to integration, only to then conclude 
that desegregation had resulted in ―appalling, demoralizing, intolerable, 
and disgraceful‖ conditions.‖120 Among these conditions were dubiously 
documented spikes in ―fighting, lying, stealing,‖ and ―vandalism,‖121 as 
well as factors that appeared to have little to do with whether schools were 
integrated or segregated, like black illegitimacy. Vaguely citing ―sex 
problems,‖ the committee asserted that ―[o]ne out of every four Negro 
children born in the District of Columbia is illegitimate‖ and that ―[t]he 
number of cases of venereal disease among Negroes of school age has 
been found to be astounding and tragic.‖122 Providing no real data on how 
such rates had been tabulated or why they were even relevant, Williams 
moved quickly to the now-standard segregationist argument that integrated 
schools would quickly lead to interracial sex, a fear that in his words 
 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., John N. Popham, Mississippi Jury Acquits 2 Accused in Youth‘s Killing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1955, at 1.  
 119. SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE PUB. SCH. STANDARDS AND CONDITIONS, AND JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY IN THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, H. COMM. ON THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, 84TH CONG., REP. 
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL CONDITIONS (Comm. Print 1957). 
 120. Id. at 24.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 45. 
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explained ―the exodus of the white residents of the District of 
Columbia.‖123 Hoping that white flight might provide a bridge-issue 
between whites in the North and South, Williams concluded his report by 
recommending ―that racially separate public schools be reestablished for 
the education of white and Negro pupils in the District of Columbia, and 
that such schools be maintained on a completely separate and equal 
basis.‖124  
However, two members of the subcommittee, DeWitt Hyde and A. L. 
Miller, refused to sign the final report, pointing to larger problems with the 
way that Williams had marshaled his data.
125
 ―The report seems to blame 
all of the educational deficiencies in our school system entirely on the 
efforts toward integration,‖ argued the two dissenters, who refused to 
―believe that everything that is wrong with the educational system can be 
blamed on integration.‖126 Further, the objectors found methodological 
problems with the way that the committee had conducted its hearings, 
including reliance on ―leading questions‖ and carefully ―selected‖ 
witnesses who ended up providing testimony that ―does not appear to be 
well-balanced, or objective, since persons with views not in accord with 
those of the counsel were not given full and fair opportunity to testify.‖127 
Though little more than a smear campaign, Williams‘s doctored report 
indicates the extent to which segregationists like him went to link 
integration, immorality, and delinquency in the post-Brown era. Signs that 
such a move held out real advantages for the South emerged in other 
places as well, including the archives of well-respected southern 
moderates like Estes Kefauver.
128
 A Tennessee Senator who claimed to 
support civil rights, Kefauver nevertheless became deeply interested in the 
degeneration of children, a subject that he pursued while heading the 
Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency from 1955 to 
1957.
129
 During his tenure, Kefauver initiated investigations into comic 
books, television, motion pictures, and pornography, all with an eye to 
―the impact of their respective products on juvenile behavior.‖130  
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Though he never once mentioned race, Kefauver echoed arguments 
made by segregationists like Williams, Talmadge, and Eastland about the 
vulnerability of children. In a speech on July 6, 1955, for example, he 
proclaimed that children are ―subject to a wide variety of influences and 
conditions which tend to either lessen or increase [their] chances of 
becoming delinquent.‖131 Such influences included poor family 
background, particularly parents who suffered from ―financial lack, health, 
or emotional handicaps.‖132 Kefauver also emphasized the role that 
schools played in child development, noting that they were the ―only 
social agency that comes in contact with every child,‖ and that they 
remained ―second only to the family in being responsible for preparing the 
child for life.‖133 
Rather than push for the integration of public schools, however, 
Kefauver focused instead on ―exploring ways in which the Federal 
Government can assist the States to strengthen and improve . . . 
correctional institutions, juvenile detention centers, and juvenile police 
bureaus.‖134 Citing problems with funding and staff training, Kefauver 
articulated a federal role in juvenile justice, one that might be helpful in 
―fortifying and strengthening . . . delinquency institutions.‖135 This interest 
tracked the attention of other moderates in the South who viewed juvenile 
justice as a critical part of the post-Brown paradigm, both as a means of 
assuaging white fears that integration would damage their children, and as 
a way of dealing with many of the behaviors that segregationists like John 
Bell Williams had highlighted in Washington, D.C. schools.
136
 
Yet, Kefauver never drew a link between delinquency and 
desegregation. Why? One possible explanation is that he enjoyed black 
electoral support, and had been aided significantly by black voters in 
defeating a ―Crump machine‖ candidate in 1948.137 Another related 
possibility is that Kefauver harbored aspirations of even higher office.
138
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Hoping for the White House, Kefauver may have deliberately avoided 
open discussions of race to secure not only black votes, but also white 
votes in the North and West.
139
 Continuing along these lines, Kefauver 
worked carefully—perhaps more carefully than others—to align his policy 
positions with moral campaigns that mapped, but did not mention, race.  
For example, during his time as head of the Subcommittee to 
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Kefauver developed a committed 
interest in fighting the evils of pornography. The Subcommittee 
investigated ―pornography and the sale of pornographic literature to 
juvenile delinquents.‖140 The Committee then recommended ―to bar the 
shipment of indecent literature in interstate commerce.‖141 One year later, 
Kefauver returned to the question of obscenity, this time issuing the report 
―Obscene and Pornographic Literature and Juvenile Delinquency.‖142 In 
his conclusions, Kefauver called for ―more stringent penalties for 
violations of laws concerning pornography,‖ partly because of the 
―deleterious effect of pornographic literature‖ on ―today‘s teen-age 
population.‖143 
Just as Kefauver raised the question of obscenity in the national arena, 
so too did Tennessee officials like Memphis film censor Lloyd Binford 
raise the question of obscenity at the local level—using it to ban interracial 
films.
144
 To take just a few examples, Binford declared Island in the Sun, a 
film featuring interracial romance, obscene in 1957.
145
 Similar controversy 
exploded over I Spit on Your Grave, a film about a ―light-skinned black 
man‖ who exacts revenge for his brother‘s lynching by embarking on 
―multiple affairs with white girls,‖ and the L-Shaped Room, a film about a 
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―young pregnant white woman‖ who enjoys ―unexpected intimacy‖ with a 
―lonely [N]egro musician.‖146  
While Kefauver may have been motivated to control such films, 
battling pornography provided him with more than simply an excuse for 
suppressing interracial media; it also provided him with a facially-neutral, 
politically viable rationale for joining his southern kinsmen in dramatically 
curtailing the scope and reach of the Supreme Court. This became 
apparent in 1959, when Kefauver joined Eastland and Talmadge, both avid 
segregationists, in proposing an amendment to the United States 
Constitution.
147
 Modeled after Eastland‘s earlier amendment removing 
power from the Court over questions of education, order, and health,
148
 the 
new amendment proved more subtle, declaring simply that the rights of 
states to ―decide on the basis of [their] own public policy questions of 
decency and morality‖ be not ―abridged.‖149  
The impetus for the law, according to Talmadge, was not Brown v. 
Board of Education but Kingsley International Picture Corporation v. 
Regents, which declared states could not ban films deemed ―immoral,‖ 
such as Lady Chatterley‘s Lover.150 To Eastland‘s mind, the ruling ―struck 
a mortal blow to the power of a State to maintain within its borders 
minimum standards of decency and morality in the content of moving 
pictures offered for exhibition.‖151 Of course, the ruling also raised the 
larger question of state regulation of morality generally, a field that had 
become increasingly active since Brown. Though Eastland, Talmadge, and 
Kefauver probably did not fear that Kingsley jeopardized the South‘s 
increasingly complex web of moral regulations on marriage, voting, 
schools, and public benefits, they undoubtedly saw an opportunity to 
remove such laws from the purview of the Supreme Court, guaranteeing a 
new era of racially coded Jim Crow.  
Further, Kingsley allowed all three southerners—two staunch 
segregationists and one moderate—to recast themselves in the role of 
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fervent champions of decency, a position that segregationists had worked 
to occupy since Brown. For example, Eastland declared Kingsley a boon 
for pornography even though the decision restricted itself to questions of 
morality. ―Something must be done,‖ proclaimed Eastland, ―to protect the 
children from these purveyors of filth and indecency in films, books, 
magazines, and all other forms of communication media.‖152 Though 
Kingsley had nothing to do with ―purveyors of filth,‖ Eastland found the 
ruling a convenient excuse for raising the more salient issue of ―the 
individual State and local community‖ being able to ―set its standards for 
morality and public decency within the community.‖153 
Talmadge reiterated this point, positing that the amendment removing 
moral regulations from the Court was necessary to combat other opinions 
as well. ―The Supreme Court is notorious for its ultraliberal rulings,‖ 
lamented the Georgia Senator, ―[b]ut freedom, under the Court‘s 
interpretation will wreck this Nation more quickly and more completely 
than Khruschev and all his henchmen. History proves what happens to a 
Nation that loses its moral standards.‖154 Moral standards, southern state 
legislatures agreed, pointed the way to a new era of state-enforced racial 
inequality in the South. Not only were southern states rapidly exchanging 
overtly racist laws for covertly racist moral regulations, but staunch 
segregationists were beginning to intimate that massive resistance itself 
was dead.  
Indeed, just as Talmadge, Eastland, and Kefauver focused their 
attention on an apparently innocuous amendment concerning morals, so 
too did segregationist James Jackson Kilpatrick become interested in the 
question of obscenity. Not only did he begin a book on the pornography 
trade—The Smut Peddlers—but he also volunteered to write a bill on 
obscenity for a subcommittee of the Virginia State Senate.
155
 Why? One 
possibility, of course, is that he arrived independently at the conclusion 
that pornography was a growing threat to the welfare of the nation. Yet, 
Kilpatrick‘s private correspondence hinted at two slightly more subtle 
rationales. First, Kilpatrick was already beginning to doubt the efficacy of 
massive resistance. In a letter dated March 12, 1959, he confessed that any 
law designed to thwart Brown that explicitly mentioned segregation or 
race comprised little more than ―a sitting duck for the guns of Federal 
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judges.‖156 Further, any ―plan‖ aimed at preserving segregation, reasoned 
Kilpatrick, ―never can succeed at all if it is tied in any way to the 
integration controversy.‖157 Here, from the pen of interposition‘s architect, 
was a call for subterfuge—just the kind of subterfuge that Eastland‘s 
amendment reserving moral regulations to the states represented. And, 
here was an argument for making an appeal to the nation that might 
actually work. 
Three years earlier, Kilpatrick had held out a similar hope for 
interposition, describing it as a viable theory that ―offered a constitutional 
justification for resistance at a high level.‖158 Unfortunately for him, few 
agreed. Rather than elevate southern discourse, interposition seemed to 
have corrupted it, giving white extremists more bile to spew at the nation‘s 
highest tribunal. By 1959, that bile had sickened America: Little Rock 
remained a painful memory, the Supreme Court had reaffirmed its judicial 
supremacy, and massive resistance had entered a ―thermidorean 
reaction.‖159 For Kilpatrick, who had long realized the South‘s desperate 
need to appeal to majority voters in the North and West, a new strategy 
was needed, a new slogan that might unite the region with the rest of the 
country and might turn back the federal tide.
160
 Enter pornography. ―I have 
come down pregnant with another book,‖ wrote Kilpatrick in September 
1959, ―a serious, and I hope a thoughtful and a profitable book on the 
obscenity racket.‖161 Though he did not mention segregation or race, 
familiar themes began to emerge between the new project and the old. As 
Kilpatrick described it, the ―heart and soul‖ of the pornography trade was 
―not the grown-up sucker,‖ but ―the curious child, the adolescent of 
sixteen or seventeen receptive to a little dirty sex.‖162 Kilpatrick noted that 
the officials questioned by the Committee to Investigate Juvenile 
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Delinquency tended to agree ―that lewd photographs and magazines 
stimulate latent sexual desires among adolescents and tend to trigger 
serious sex crimes.‖163 Conceding that concrete data proving obscenity 
caused delinquency was elusive, Kilpatrick nevertheless invoked 
―common sense,‖ noting that ―[b]etween 1948 and 1957 juvenile court 
cases increased by 136 per cent while the under-seventeen population 
[increased] by only 27 per cent.‖164 Then, Kilpatrick referred to the 
testimony of Dr. George W. Henry, a professor of clinical psychiatry at 
Cornell, who agreed that children could ―be sexually perverted by looking 
at, by studying, and by dwelling upon photos‖ that were pornographic.165 
Kilpatrick‘s ―common sense‖ view that obscenity encouraged 
delinquency coincided with the equally common sense view that 
integration encouraged delinquency, marking a tendency to view social 
reform generally through the lens of degeneracy. Precisely because 
pornography was increasingly considered a national threat to children—as 
Kefauver claimed—Kilpatrick saw in it bridge possibilities, an opportunity 
for communicating southern political positions to the nation, much like 
interposition. After documenting the myriad harms that pornography 
caused youth, in other words, Kilpatrick concluded that a localized, state-
centered approach to the problem of porn made the most sense—a position 
that coincided nicely with opposition to Brown. Invoking Justice Harlan‘s 
opinions in the consolidated cases of Alberts v. California and Roth v. 
United States,
166
 Kilpatrick noted that ―Congress has no substantive power 
over matters of sexual morality,‖ a nod to the myriad moral regulations 
rapidly spreading through the South.
167
 The only relevant constitutional 
provisions, he posited, were congressional powers ―to establish post roads, 
to regulate commerce, and to control goods imported into the country.‖168 
To Kilpatrick‘s mind, none of these were particularly relevant to 
obscenity, meaning that ―federal authority thus is attenuated, and ‗the 
dangers of federal censorship in this field are far greater than anything the 
states may do.‘‖169 Instead, he argued, the states should take control. ―The 
fifty states,‖ argued Kilpatrick, ―provide fifty experimental laboratories, in 
which legislative bodies may experiment in different ways with the 
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treatment of social problems.‖170 Acknowledging that certain states may 
choose to ban material that had literary merit, Kilpatrick took a remarkably 
federalist view. ―If the State of Georgia sought to ban‖ a particular work, 
he surmised, ―the literati of Atlanta could pick up a copy in New Orleans 
or New York, or order it by mail.‖171 Presumably, the same would be true 
if ―the State of Georgia‖ chose to assign students to schools based on 
attenuated notions of their moral character. Once reduced to the 
conscience of the community, segregation might live again. 
Yet, Kilpatrick remained cautious. Already aware of how sterling 
arguments like interposition could be galloped through the mud, he took a 
conservatively liberal stance on the question of obscenity. To his mind, a 
second cultural conflict existed in the South, not a struggle between blacks 
and whites, but a ―war‖ as Kilpatrick described it, ―between the Philistines 
and the literati.‖172 In this war, the Philistines—represented by the likes of 
James Eastland and Herman Talmadge—consistently risked jeopardizing 
the South‘s politics by making those politics appear so histrionic that 
voters in the North and West recoiled—just as they had recoiled when 
extremists besmirched the legal theory of interposition. If the South were 
to truly wage, and win, a new cultural war, believed Kilpatrick, it would 
have to adopt a more educated tone and acquire a more discerning taste. 
The discriminators, literally, had to become more discriminating. ―It is this 
inability to discriminate, on the part of the Philistines,‖ wrote Kilpatrick, 
―that has caused me so much trouble.‖173 ―The same unreasoning illogic 
that alphabetizes Tortilla Flat and Turbulent Daughters side by side in [a 
National Organization for Decent Literature] list,‖ he lamented, ―sees a 
work of D. H. Lawrence, a dirty picture from Roy Oakley, and a 
contraceptive device all brought to bar under the same‖ obscenity law.174 
Such failures to discriminate, he complained, make ―no sense to me.‖175 
To rescue the South‘s Philistines from themselves, Kilpatrick advanced 
a moderate obscenity law for Virginia, meanwhile establishing a fund for 
cultural uplift in the state. Perhaps ironically, he received a donation for 
his fund from Harper Lee, one of the South‘s most nationally recognized 
authors.
176
 Just as Kilpatrick had feared, a local white school board had 
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embarrassed itself by banning Lee‘s novel To Kill a Mockingbird for being 
―immoral,‖177 the same charge leveled at Lady Chatterley‘s Lover in 
Kingsley v. Regents.
178
 Outraged, Lee sent Kilpatrick ten dollars to enroll 
the Hanover County, Virginia, school board ―in any first grade of its 
choice.‖179 Rather than an ―immoral‖ celebration of integration, lamented 
Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird represented ―a code of honor‖ that was ―the 
heritage of all Southerners,‖180 an odd formulation given that the book had 
come to be associated with the black struggle for civil rights, not southern 
honor or history.
181
 Yet, Lee‘s invocation of southern honor implied that 
she too was interested in advancing a positive stereotype of the white 
segregationist, a move exemplified by Lee‘s lead character Atticus Finch, 
an endearing lawyer who treated blacks with affection and respect.
182
 That 
Lee enlisted Kilpatrick in a defense of her book underscores the manner in 
which white cultural elites struggled to reframe Jim Crow in a positive 
light, countering negative frames of segregationists perpetuated by both 
white extremists and the Civil Rights Movement.  
To illustrate just how intensely movement activists and segregationists 
engaged one another on cultural terrain, the next Part will recover direct 
exchanges between prominent segregationists like James Jackson 
Kilpatrick and black proponents of civil rights like James Baldwin and 
Martin Luther King, Jr., over the question of stereotyping. Out of this 
picture emerges a glimpse of the significance that popular culture played 
in the struggle for civil rights. 
IV. CULTURAL EXCHANGE 
Lee‘s frustration with Virginia extremists—the very whites who 
banned her book in Hanover County—belied a larger struggle that the 
white ―literati‖ would wage in the 1960s to preserve a dignified defense of 
segregation in the South. The effort to advance a culturally positive frame 
for Jim Crow suffered setbacks by white extremists and black activists, 
including black ―literati‖ who openly challenged white claims to cultural 
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supremacy. To take just a few examples, in 1963 black author James 
Baldwin took on Kilpatrick in an anthology commemorating the 100th 
anniversary of emancipation in America. Baldwin‘s comments targeted 
segregationist efforts to advance negative black stereotypes. ―White 
people,‖ charged Baldwin, ―will have to ask themselves precisely why 
they found it necessary to invent [negative racial stereotypes of African 
Americans]‖ while ―[b]lack people will have to do something very hard, 
too, which is to allow the white citizen his first awkward steps toward 
maturity.‖183 A clear slap in the face to Kilpatrick and others who claimed 
that whites were culturally superior, Baldwin‘s allusion to white 
immaturity underscored the manner in which black activists sought to 
invert racial stereotypes—in this case recasting African Americans as 
superior to whites, a point that Baldwin sharpened by suggesting blacks 
cure whites of their psychological shortcomings.
 ―We have, indeed,‖ 
Baldwin continued, subtly alluding to the psychological data in footnote 
11 of Brown, ―functioned in this country in precisely that way for a very 
long time—we were the first psychiatrists here.‖184 Baldwin‘s reference to 
blacks as psychiatrists echoed Brown‘s reliance on psychiatry, even as it 
underscored a larger point, exemplified in the title of his essay, that 
southern whites suffered psychological dysfunction, a ―White Problem,‖ 
as he put it, that African Americans needed to help them with.
185
 Incensed, 
Kilpatrick responded to Baldwin‘s charge, but not before reading 
Baldwin‘s Fire Next Time, which deliberately challenged the 
segregationist claim that blacks suffered from lower cultural standards 
than whites. ―White people cannot, in the generality,‖ wrote Baldwin, ―be 
taken as models of how to live. Rather, the white man is himself in sore 
need of new standards, which will release him from his confusion and 
place him once again in fruitful communion with the depths of his own 
being.‖186 Indignant, Kilpatrick confessed to being shocked that Baldwin 
did not want to adopt ―the white man‘s cultural, social, religious, or moral 
values,‖ and he countered briskly that neither were whites ―interested in 
adopting the Negro‘s cultural, social, religious, or moral values,‖ values 
that, in Kilpatrick‘s prejudiced view, had contributed little to Western 
Civilization since the days of slavery.
187
 Africa‘s ―phallic sculptures,‖ 
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mocked Kilpatrick, ―are truly very fine phallic sculptures. Doubtless they 
are. The mud huts were the strongest mud huts ever contrived. . . . [B]ut if 
true, what then? Is a mud hut a Monticello, a carved root a bust by 
Rodin?‖188  
Kilpatrick‘s invocation of art and architecture to counter Baldwin 
underscores the extent to which debates about culture infused the 
discourse of civil rights in the 1960s. Direct action protest contributed to 
these debates, often challenging segregationist stereotypes and pressing 
theorists like Kilpatrick to amend—though not surrender—their cultural 
positions. For example, during the student sit-ins of 1960, Kilpatrick 
conceded that well-dressed, disciplined black college students posed a 
challenge to white stereotypes of black cultural inferiority, even inverting 
these stereotypes and making whites look backward and uncivilized. In 
1960, Kilpatrick wrote:  
Many a Virginian must have felt a tinge of wry regret . . . in reading 
of Saturday‘s ―sitdowns‖ by Negro students in Richmond stores. 
Here were the colored students, in coats, white shirts, ties, and one 
of them was reading Goethe and one was taking notes from a 
biology text. And here, on the sidewalk outside, was a gang of white 
boys come to heckle, a ragtail rabble, slack-jawed, black-jacketed, 
grinning fit to kill, and some of them, God save the mark, were 
waving the proud and honored flag of the Southern States in the last 
war fought by gentlemen. Eheu! It gives one pause.
189
  
Kilpatrick‘s disappointment with the poor behavior of white hecklers—the 
very philistines that he and Harper Lee loathed—pointed to the manner in 
which direct action protest inverted racial stereotypes of black cultural 
inferiority. Black demonstrators deliberately upset such stereotypes, 
purposely remaining non-violent, intentionally embarrassing their white 
counterparts, and, as Kilpatrick noted in Richmond, even appropriating 
elite cultural markers—in this case Goethe—something that the white 
―rabble‖ eschewed. 
Aware of the manner in which such protest could either challenge or 
reinforce stereotypes, black activist James Lawson stressed the importance 
of maintaining a particular cultural image to the success of direct action 
protest. One of the leaders of the student sit-ins in Nashville, Lawson 
advised women who wanted to participate in demonstrations to wear 
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stockings and heels, while men should don coats and ties.
190
 John Lewis, 
who also worked with Lawson, routinely handed out rules of engagement 
to student demonstrators that focused not only on dress, but on manners, 
including directives that students remain courteous, sit straight while at the 
counter, and refrain from cursing.
191
 
As black demonstrators deliberately enlisted cultural practice, 
language, dress, and so on, white voices joined Kilpatrick in lamenting the 
precise manner in which the sit-ins exposed white cultural deficiencies. 
―[S]outhern white people are human,‖ exclaimed Georgia Senator Richard 
Russell.
192
 He continued, ―They feel that they are being baited like animals 
. . . . What is more, they feel that they are being baited for political 
purposes . . . . They are sensitive; this is no time to be trying to provoke a 
race riot.‖193 Russell‘s confession that southern whites were easily 
baited—―like animals‖—hinted at an insecurity that gripped elite 
southerners, an insecurity that the white South generally could not, in fact, 
live up to its pretensions of cultural superiority. If black demonstrators 
continued exposing those pretensions, both Kilpatrick and Russell feared 
that national attitudes towards the region might shift in favor of civil 
rights. In reference to the violence that the sit-ins risked provoking from 
―sensitive‖ southern whites, Russell claimed to ―know who will be blamed 
for it‖ and ―who will be denounced all over the country.‖194 He concluded, 
―It will be the white people of the South.‖195 
To bolster white legitimacy, Russell turned to personal morality, 
underscoring the link between civil rights and sex. ―Why do not those 
newspapers that constantly criticize‖ the South, argued Russell, ―advise 
our Negro friends to do something to improve themselves,‖ including 
―reduce their illegitimacy from 10 times that of the rest of the country to 5 
times.‖196 Russell‘s charge resonated with arguments made by other 
segregationists, including Judge Thomas Pickens Brady‘s argument that 
―obscenity and depravity‖ permeated black culture and justified Jim 
Crow.
197
 Of course, such malevolent portrayals of black life as obscene 
 
 
 190. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954–63, at 274 
(1988). 
 191. TOWNSEND DAVIS, WEARY FEET, RESTED SOULS: A GUIDED HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 356 (1998).  
 192. 106 CONG. REC. 3,700 (1960) (statement of Sen. Richard Russell). 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 3,699 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 197. BRADY, supra note 29, at 47.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] A HORRIBLE FASCINATION 1049 
 
 
 
 
belied segregationists‘ own efforts to artificially exaggerate the extent of 
black degeneracy, something that the Mississippi legislature attempted by 
invalidating common law marriage. Further, segregationist attempts to 
portray black culture as sexually licentious did little to assuage their own 
fears that a majority of whites might in fact be more than happy to mix 
socially and romantically with blacks under integrated conditions.  
Such fears became apparent in 1957, when Twentieth Century Fox 
released Island in the Sun, which featured two interracial couples,
198
 these 
two relationships disturbed segregationists in Memphis so much that they 
declared the film ―offensive to moral standards‖ and censored it, a move 
replicated in other cities across the South.
199
 Of course, such outright 
declarations of interracial relations as obscene were unconstitutional, even 
as they underscored the manner in which obscenity itself became part of a 
larger discourse on race, rights, and sex.  
Picking up on the same discourse that had driven states like Mississippi 
and North Carolina to tinker with illegitimacy rates, for example, Richard 
Russell argued that Congress ―should put a stop to this business of 
establishing relief programs that encourage illegitimacy,‖200 even as he 
leveled his guns at civil rights leaders who also happened to be ministers, 
a clear attempt to counter the ―moral‖ message of Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Andrew Young, and others. ―Why do the Negro preachers not do 
something,‖ queried Russell, ―about unfortunate conditions such as I have 
mentioned?‖201  
Of course, black preachers involved in the Civil Rights Movement 
focused on obtaining civil rights, not reducing out-of-wedlock births—an 
issue that should have had little to do with constitutional rights. Yet, even 
high-ranking black activists like King recognized the manner in which 
white segregationists would, and did, use questions of sexual culture to 
undermine black constitutional positions: ―The ‗behavior deviants‘ within 
the Negro community stem from the economic deprivation, emotional 
frustration, and social isolation which are the inevitable concomitants of 
segregation. When the white man argues that segregation should continue 
because of the Negro‘s lagging standards, he fails to see that the standards 
lag because of segregation.‖202 Despite King‘s awareness that differences 
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in standards had little to do with innate racial traits, he conceded that the 
question of standards was so linked to the question of legal rights in the 
South that improving black standards—even though they had nothing to 
do with formal, constitutional claims—could in fact have a constitutional 
effect:  
―By improving our standards here and now we will go a long way 
toward breaking down the arguments of the segregationist. . . . [W]e 
must work on two fronts. On the one hand, we must continue to 
resist the system of segregation which is the basic cause of our 
lagging standards; on the other hand we must work constructively to 
improve the standards themselves. There must be a rhythmic 
alternation between attacking the causes and healing the effects.
203
 
King‘s awareness of the standards/rights link derived directly from his 
experience in Montgomery. In fact, leaders in Montgomery had wrestled 
with the cultural contingency of rights since at least 1955, when an 
African American woman named Claudette Colvin refused to give up her 
seat on a city bus.
204
 Interested in launching a test case challenging 
Montgomery‘s segregated transportation system, local civil rights leaders 
Edgar Daniel Nixon and Jo Ann Robinson considered using Colvin as a 
plaintiff but ultimately rejected the idea once they discovered that she was 
pregnant and single.
205
 Colvin‘s own mother confessed that her daughter 
had ―done took a tumble.‖206 Shortly thereafter, another African American 
woman—Mary Louise Smith—also refused to give up her seat to a white 
on a Montgomery bus. Smith‘s candidacy failed because of her family 
background, particularly her father‘s alcoholism.207 As Nixon later put it, 
if reporters attempted to interview the Smith family, ―we wouldn‘t have a 
leg to stand on.‖208 
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Cultural considerations pushed movement leaders to advance the case 
of Rosa Parks, a longtime member of the local NAACP and Claudette 
Colvin‘s NAACP Youth Council mentor.209 Unlike Colvin and Smith, 
Parks had no illegitimate children and no history of familial alcoholism. 
While this quality should have been as irrelevant as basic citizenship, it 
made her better suited, culturally, to bring a constitutional case.
210
 
According to Jo Ann Robinson, ―Mrs. Parks had the caliber of character 
we needed to get the city to rally behind us.‖211 
Just as Rosa Parks satisfied the invisible cultural requirements needed 
to claim constitutional rights, so too did the college students that 
participated in the 1960 sit-ins challenge the cultural presumptions 
bolstering black repression and white supremacy. As black activist James 
Farmer noted:  
Newspaper and television accounts of the sit-ins suggested a picture 
which reversed the common stereotypes. Inside, at the lunch 
counters, sat well-dressed, well-mannered Negro college students 
with their calculus and philosophy books, quietly asking for a cup 
of coffee; outside, crowds of white boys with duck-tail haircuts and 
leather jackets grinned and shuffled their feet and tried to start 
trouble.
212
 
That hairstyles, clothing, and other distinctly cultural attributes factored 
into the significance of civil rights demonstrations reveals the cultural 
contingency of rights in the 1960s, a subtext rarely acknowledged by 
constitutional scholars of the period. 
Yet, Kilpatrick continued to hammer the question of illegitimacy. 
―[T]he rate of illegitimacy among American Negroes creeps steadily,‖ he 
wrote in 1963, ―toward the point at which one of every four Negro babies 
will be born in bastardy.‖213 Conceding that ―the white man is no paragon 
of virtue,‖ Kilpatrick maintained that beneath the legalist debate over 
constitutional rights lay a much larger debate over culture and behavior.
214
 
―We are talking of manners,‖ he posited, ―of civility, of sobriety, of 
restraints upon carnality.‖215 
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Even as he worked to preserve a link between ―carnality‖ and 
constitutional law, so too did Kilpatrick express further outrage at the 
movement‘s tactics, particularly its deliberate provocation of white 
violence in places like Greensboro and Birmingham. This became 
particularly apparent when Kilpatrick read Martin Luther King, Jr.‘s 
memoir about the Birmingham protest, Why We Can‘t Wait: 
[T]he work should be required reading in every police department 
in the nation. Here Dr. King spells it out, with impersonal 
detachment, just how these things work: Committees must be 
organized, and schedules must be arranged of persons to be 
arrested; the police must be provoked into acts of brutality, 
calculated to look good on television (he recalls that his 
demonstration in Birmingham almost failed two years ago, when 
the police were at first too polite and cheerful).
216
  
Though appalled at the manner in which King had successfully 
manipulated white authorities, Kilpatrick expressed a begrudging 
admiration for the ―reverend doctor.‖217 ―One does not have to admire the 
techniques of Martin Luther King,‖ he wrote, ―to respect his mastery of 
them.‖218 To his mind, King possessed ―a certain genius in timing, 
showmanship, publicity management, administrative leadership, and the 
ability to influence the opinions of others.‖219 Of course, Kilpatrick had 
himself attempted to influence the opinions of others since at least the 
beginning of his interposition campaign in 1956. Yet, King proved more 
successful, so successful in fact that the Birmingham demonstrations 
pushed Kilpatrick to confess that the white governor of the state, rather 
than a paragon of cultural superiority, was an ―idiot.‖220  
Kilpatrick would again concede ground after the movement staged 
another round of successful demonstrations in Selma, Alabama, during the 
spring of 1965. After months of buildup, black protesters launched a 
march across Selma‘s Edmund Pettus Bridge only to be physically stopped 
by Alabama police who, in a well-televised sequence, gassed, clubbed, and 
horsewhipped them back across the Alabama River.
221
 One week later, 
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northern activist Viola Liuzzo was shot by members of the Ku Klux 
Klan,
222
 prompting even Kilpatrick to express profound regret:  
Those of us who have lived all our lives in the South, and loved the 
South abidingly, must feel the stain of Alabama like a wound. . . . 
The South has many needs, but perhaps the greatest of these is its 
need to recognize more clearly its membership in the American 
Union . . . . They [Liuzzo and Reverend James Reeb, also killed by 
the Klan] had moral rights and constitutional rights . . . . And 
Governor, it was the first duty of State and local government to 
make those rights secure.
223
 
Chastened by philistines in Alabama, Kilpatrick stood by helplessly as 
Congress enacted a robust voting rights bill that would ultimately 
empower the federal government to strike down unreasonable restrictions 
on voting, including the kinds of restrictions that disenfranchised unwed 
mothers in Georgia and Louisiana. ―[U]nder the Constitution,‖ complained 
Kilpatrick, ―each State clearly has the power ‗to determine the 
qualifications of electors,‘‖ a reality that neither Congress nor the 
President seemed interested in upholding as they ―trampled‖ the nation‘s 
founding document ―underfoot.‖224 Yet, Kilpatrick‘s whimpers won few 
listeners. The violence in Selma galvanized national opinion against 
southern recalcitrance, closing the curtain on constitutionally strained 
arguments about racial standards, illegitimacy rates, and cultural 
―shortcomings‖—at least for the moment. 
V. PERFECT AMMUNITION 
Though muted by Selma, segregationist discourses on race and culture 
reemerged later that year, after an unforeseen explosion in California. One 
week after President Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into 
law, there was an altercation between an African American male and a Los 
Angeles police officer in the heavily black L.A. neighborhood of Watts.
225
 
The officer, while trying to arrest twenty-one year old Marquette Frye for 
drunk driving, also subdued Frye‘s mother, triggering sporadic rock 
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throwing and violence.
226
 By 10:00 p.m. that night, eighty police officers 
had been deployed to cordon off a sixteen-block area. Unrest continued 
through the following day as black youth attacked police and passersby, 
burning cars and throwing rocks.
227
 By nightfall, papers reported crowds 
of up to 7,000 in the streets, stores looted, and cars burned. Over three 
hundred police, sheriffs, and highway patrolmen were deployed to quell 
the disorder as fires erupted and firefighters were shot at, leaving entire 
city blocks burning out of control.
228
 According to one account, ―[t]he 
150-block section of Los Angeles last night took on the pearance [sic] of a 
war zone with men crouching in the shadows, streets littered with debris or 
completely torn up, store windows broken and scorched and a pall of 
smoke hanging over the area.‖229 Six days, thirty-four deaths, and over 
1000 injured after it began, one of the largest riots in American history 
drew to a close.
230
 
Stunned, President Johnson ensured that former Central Intelligence 
Agency director John McCone would become chairman of the California 
state inquiry commission charged with investigating the causes of the 
unrest.
231
 Before McCone had time to issue a report, however, critics 
pounced. On August 14, 1965, three days after the arrest of Marquette 
Frye and in the middle of the rioting, the Los Angeles Times printed a story 
asserting that the cause of the riots was not police brutality, poor housing, 
or lack of opportunity but a breakdown in the black family. ―The 
administration,‖ asserted the article, ―is redirecting its main focus on racial 
problems from the South to large urban areas as the result of an 
unpublished Labor Department report that blames Negro unrest on the 
breakdown of the Negro family structure.‖232 The report to which the Los 
Angeles Times referred was an in-house memo drafted by Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, then Assistant Secretary of Labor and Director of the 
Department‘s Office of Policy Planning and Research.233 Apparently 
unaware of the extensive debate over illegitimacy that had simmered in the 
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South since Brown, Moynihan took illegitimacy and divorce rates in the 
North and recast them not as symptoms of economic inequality—which 
black sociologist Franklin Frazier claimed they were
234—but as causes of 
economic inequality. ―As the result of family disorganization,‖ asserted 
Moynihan quoting Frazier, ―a large proportion of Negro children and 
youth have not undergone the socialization which only the family can 
provide. . . . [F]amily disorganization has been partially responsible for a 
large amount of juvenile delinquency and adult crime among Negroes,‖ a 
point that papers like the Times would use to suggest a cause of the 
riots.
235
 Further, Moynihan posited that the primary source of familial 
―disorganization‖ was not racism but ―the failure of the [black] father to 
play the role in family life required by American society,‖ and that ―the 
mitigation of this problem must await those changes in the Negro and 
American society which will enable the Negro father to play the role 
required of him.‖236 
Moynihan‘s report constituted a dramatic counterpoint to the Supreme 
Court‘s ruling in Brown, which had argued that segregation damaged 
black youth, not black fathers. Yet, the Wall Street Journal printed an 
article on August 16, 1965, that declared the Moynihan report to be an 
explanation for the Watts riot: 
Behind the past week‘s orgy of Negro rioting . . . lies a sickness that 
all the new civil rights legislation is powerless to cure in the 
foreseeable future—the spreading disintegration of Negro family 
life in the big cities of the North and West. The rioters who by 
yesterday had brought death to 31 people and injuries to another 
676, and who had burned an estimated $175 million worth of 
property, including entire blocks, in Los Angeles were not 
protesting any specific civil rights grievances. They were primarily 
young hoodlums lashing out against society. . . . A growing army of 
such youths is being bred in the Negro sections of cities across the 
country by broken homes, illegitimacy and other social ills that have 
grown steadily worse in recent decades . . . .
237
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The Journal‘s emphasis on broken homes led directly to the citation of 
black illegitimacy rates:  
The breakdown of family life . . . can be glimpsed in nearly any set 
of Negro social statistics—nationwid . . . . In New York City‘s 
Harlem, for instance, where Negro rioting flared for a week last 
year, it‘s estimated one of every five Negro children born is 
illegitimate. An indication of the social evils this breeds: 
Researchers in one Harlem district not long ago found venereal 
disease running at 2,143 cases per 100,000 people . . . . Against this 
background, the Los Angeles explosion begins to come a bit clearer. 
Otherwise it might seem inexplicable.
238
 
The Journal‘s turn to black illegitimacy rates as a cause of rioting proved 
a haunting parallel to southern discourses on black moral shortcomings 
workshopped across the South since the 1950s. Indeed, James Jackson 
Kilpatrick himself had focused on such rates in the aftermath of 
Birmingham in 1963.
239
 Now he reentered the debate, this time writing for 
a nationally syndicated column called ―A Conservative View‖:  
Say what you will about the South . . . the American Negro has had 
two generations of reasonable opportunity in the unsegregated 
North and West. How has he developed the opportunities put before 
him? In squalor, in apathy, in crime, in cadging off ―the welfare,‖ in 
dropping out of integrated schools, [and] in breeding swarms of 
children out of wedlock. This is the sorry record. And now, in Los 
Angeles, we witness barbarian hordes.
240
  
Once ashamed of white delinquents acting out at lunch counters, 
Kilpatrick rejoiced over blacks rioting in Watts. ―Outside the South,‖ 
wrote Kilpatrick, ―this autumn also sees a changing mood, far more 
abrupt, much easier to read. The sacking of Los Angeles marked high 
water in the long-suffering tolerance of the American people for the 
criminal excesses of a Negro minority.‖241  
Kilpatrick‘s mention of a changing mood belied a larger discursive 
convergence, at least within conservative circles, between segregationist 
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discourses of race and national explanations for riots. On August 18, 1965, 
for example, conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak 
also cited the Moynihan Report. ―Weeks before []the Negro ghetto of Los 
Angeles erupted in violence,‖ wrote Evans and Novak, ―intense debate 
over how to handle such racial powder kegs was under way deep inside 
the Johnson administration.‖242 The ―pivot of this debate,‖ they continued, 
was the Moynihan Report, ―a much-suppressed, much-leaked Labor 
Department document which strips away usual equivocations and exposes 
the ugly truth about the big-city Negro‘s plight.‖243 Evans and Novak 
framed the report as something that the Johnson administration was 
reluctant to endorse openly. ―[W]hen Moynihan wanted to release the 
report,‖ they asserted, ―he was stopped by his boss—Secretary of Labor 
Willard Wirtz. In private conversation, Wirtz expressed fear that evidence 
of Negro illegitimacy would be grist for racist propaganda mills.‖244  
The idea that Moynihan‘s report might bolster southern critiques of 
black rights was not lost on the White House. Others within the Johnson 
administration expressed similar views. Harry McPherson, special 
assistant and counsel to the President, recounted an argument with 
Moynihan over possible southern responses. ―I was afraid that it was 
going to be perfect ammunition for the Southerners,‖ explained 
McPherson later.
245
 McPherson continued, ―I could imagine Holmes 
Alexander or someone like that writing a mocking piece, ‗Aha, I told you 
so. They‘re all a bunch of bastards and immoral people!‘‖246 
Despite McPherson‘s warnings, Moynihan continued to push his 
report, and the White House went along. President Johnson himself 
referenced black illegitimacy rates during a speech drafted by Moynihan 
and delivered at Howard University on June 4, 1965:
247
  
Perhaps most important . . . is the breakdown of the Negro family 
structure. . . . Only a minority—less than half—of all Negro 
children reach the age of 18 having lived all their lives with both of 
their parents. At this moment little less than two-thirds are living 
with both of their parents. Probably a majority of all Negro children 
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receive federally aided public assistance sometime during their 
childhood.
248
  
Though President Johnson claimed that ―white America‖ was partly to 
blame for the disintegration of the black family,
249
 some saw a more 
strategic motive behind his reference to illegitimacy rates. As Lee 
Rainwater and William Yancey put it, President Johnson‘s adoption of 
Moynihan‘s report gave him a way to ―leap-frog‖ the Civil Rights 
Movement, to take the moral high ground from blacks and return it to 
whites, providing the administration with a rhetorical tool for countering 
increasingly radical movement demands.
250
 
Whether he was aware of segregationist strategy in the South or not, 
Moynihan placed the question of black marital customs, and consequently 
black culture, at the forefront of the national racial debate, revivifying 
Christian defenses of Jim Crow. Once battered by Selma, southern 
segregationists rallied, joining Moynihan‘s chorus on the floor of the 
Senate. In the wake of the L.A. riots, South Carolina Senator Strom 
Thurmond introduced the following letter into the Congressional Record: 
DEAR CITIZENS: No society or nation is stronger than the homes 
that make up that nation or society. Until every man and woman is 
willing to stand before God and his neighbors and say: ―We are 
united ‗til death do us part,‖ and every parent is willing to say: 
―You are my child until death do us part,‖ we as a nation will find 
our Government corrupt. Democracy, values, sharing, and respect 
for the rights of human beings must be taught and learned at 
home.
251
  
West Virginia Senator Robert C. Byrd agreed. Lamenting the ―5-day orgy 
of rioting, murder, racial battling, setting of fires, looting, and wanton 
destruction of property‖ in Los Angeles,252 Byrd stood before Congress 
and called for family planning:  
[F]amily planning is imperative, and civil rights organizations 
should make intensive efforts to promote such. The high birth rate 
among low-income Negro families simply cannot be overlooked. 
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. . . Additionally, the problem of illegitimacy must be dealt with. In 
New York City‘s Harlem, where Negro rioting flared last year, one 
out of every five Negro children is illegitimate.
253
  
Though Senator Byrd‘s tendency to link illegitimacy to riots was not 
particularly surprising for a southerner, more surprising was Moynihan‘s 
agreement, months after his report was completed:  
On September 18, three weeks after Senator Byrd‘s statement 
before the Senate, 
Moynihan wrote:  
From the wild Irish slums of the 19th-century European seaboard, to 
the riot-torn suburbs of Los Angeles, there is one unmistakable 
lesson in American history: a community that allows a large number 
of young men to grow up in broken families, dominated by women 
. . . that community asks for and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, 
disorder—most particularly the furious, unrestrained lashing out at 
the whole social structure—that is not only to be expected; it is very 
near to inevitable. And it is richly deserved.
254
  
No longer ignorant of southern claims, Moynihan joined them, marking a 
rare North/South, bipartisan convergence on the question of race and 
culture in the 1960s, a convergence that liberals would fight, desperately, 
to unravel in the courts.  
Even as officials within the Johnson administration, like Moynihan, 
joined segregationists in targeting illegitimacy as an explanation for urban 
unrest, more sympathetic voices responded by arguing that illegitimate 
children should be protected from the ―disabilities and moral prejudices‖ 
facing them.
255
 One such liberal was Harry Krause, an associate professor 
of law at the University of Illinois, who proposed a Uniform Act on 
Legitimacy to counter state discrepancies—like those that had emerged in 
the South in the 1950s.
256
 In 1966, Krause joined Jack Greenberg of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund in a challenge to an illegitimacy rule in 
Louisiana. The case dealt with a claim by five illegitimate children 
demanding compensation for the wrongful death of their unwed mother.
257
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In their brief, NAACP attorneys Greenberg and Leroy Clark posited that 
―classification by the criterion of illegitimacy, which appears to be racially 
neutral on its face,‖ was in fact ―covert racial discrimination.‖258 
Recognizing that whites possessed ways to hide their illegitimate births, 
Greenberg and Clark confirmed that ―a very high percentage of white 
illegitimate children are adopted, thereby achieving status under the 
Wrongful Death Act with regard to their adoptive parents, whereas nearly 
no Negro children find adoptive parents.‖259 Consequently, ―95.8 percent 
of all persons affected by discrimination against illegitimates under the 
statute are Negroes.‖260 To make matters worse, both Greenberg and Clark 
recognized that southern states like Louisiana and Mississippi had resorted 
to punitive welfare regulations in the aftermath of Brown, including the 
criminalization of ―conceiving and giving birth to two or more illegitimate 
children,‖ an offense that could garner as much as a $1000 fine or a year in 
jail.
261
  
The Supreme Court, led by Justice William Douglas, sided with the 
NAACP.
262
 To deny illegitimate children the same benefits that went to 
children with married parents, held the Court, violated equal protection.
263
 
This holding, which boldly carved out new law, indicated that the Court 
was beginning to see illegitimacy in the same way that Greenberg did, as 
the next phase in the struggle for civil rights.
264
 Greenberg made this 
explicit in his brief, which posited that ―the psychological effect of the 
stigma of bastardy upon its victim seems entirely comparable to the 
damaging psychological effects upon the victims of racial discrimination,‖ 
an argument that had formed the basis of the Court‘s equal protection 
claim in Brown.
265
 Here, southern recalcitrance backfired, pushing the 
Supreme Court to create ―new doctrine,‖ particularly in the realm of equal 
protection.
266
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The Court took equal protection even farther in an Alabama case that 
derived from southern turns to moral regulation. In King v. Smith, the 
Court struck down ―man-in-the-house‖ rules, measures denying welfare 
benefits to children who lived in the same household as a man not their 
father.
267
 At the time, ―[s]tate welfare policies had to be approved by what 
was then called the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,‖ an 
agency that traditionally approved man-in-the-house rules because they 
precluded welfare fraud (if a man was in the house, reasoned the 
government, then he could support the family).
268
 Though eight of nine 
Justices argued that the ―applicable statute‖ prevented denials of funds, 
Justice Douglas rounded out the unanimous vote against the rules, 
pronouncing them a violation of equal protection.
269
  
One year later, Justice Thurgood Marshall dealt forthrightly with the 
question of law‘s role in regulating morality in Stanley v. Georgia, a 
southern case involving the seizure of pornography in a Georgia man‘s 
home, resulting in an arrest for obscenity possession.
270
 Though the Court 
had confronted a similar fact pattern eight years earlier in Mapp v. Ohio, it 
had avoided the obscenity issue, ruling instead against the police search as 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
271
 In Stanley, Justice Marshall took 
the question of pornography head-on, holding that ―the mere private 
possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.‖272 
Though obscenity had clearly been divorced from First Amendment 
protections in earlier rulings,
273
 Justice Marshall imposed a tenuous 
distinction, noting that ―[t]he makers of our Constitution undertook to 
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness,‖ therefore 
protecting the right to possess any material, no matter how prurient, in 
―the privacy of his own home.‖274 
Though Justice Marshall did not mention race, he had long chafed at 
the South‘s effort to use ―morality arguments‖ against black rights, 
particularly its claims ―that Negroes have higher ratios of illegitimacy, 
immorality and venereal disease.‖275 Now, he struck directly at the ability 
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of southern states to regulate morals, engaging segregationists on the same 
cultural terrain that they had used, through constitutional amendment and 
otherwise, to build national support for curtailing federal judicial power. 
Further, Stanley involved the pornography collection of a southern white 
plaintiff—a subtle jab at segregationist pretensions of cultural superiority 
mobilized since Brown. 
Outraged, moralist voices lobbied President Richard Nixon to 
investigate the matter, prompting him to assign a commission to study the 
problem of obscenity. In 1970 the Commission on Obscenity and 
Pornography concluded that the Court‘s three-part test for obscenity—
whether material ―appeals to the ‗prurient‘ interest of the average person, 
is ‗patently offensive‘ in light of ‗community standards,‘ and lacks 
‗redeeming social value‘‖—did not ―provide meaningful guidance for law 
enforcement officials, juries or courts.‖276 Consequently, ―distinctions . . . 
between prohibited and permissible materials‖ had become hopelessly 
confused, leading to ―interference with the communication of 
constitutionally protected materials.‖277  
With the commission‘s report not quite the repudiation of Stanley that 
conservatives had hoped, Nixon achieved more success by replacing 
liberal justices on the Court. In 1969, he replaced Earl Warren with 
Warren Burger, and in 1972, he successfully appointed Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., and William Rehnquist, both conservatives with questionable 
commitments to civil rights. With Justices Powell and Rehnquist on board, 
the Court took a quick right turn, particularly on questions of obscenity. 
For example, in Miller v. California, the new Court ruled that the 
regulation of obscene materials should indeed revert to the states, just as 
segregationists had long argued.
278
 ―We emphasize,‖ opined the Court, 
―that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for the States.‖279 
Rather, ―community standards‖ should determine whether literature, and 
for that matter speech, was obscene, independent of ―national‖ norms.280  
While Miller did not overturn King, it coincided with a second ruling 
that dramatically changed the way the Court perceived race, shifting its 
emphasis away from compensation for past harm and towards a new 
celebration of racial/cultural difference. In Regents v. Bakke, the Court 
vindicated a white plaintiff who complained that the University of 
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California at Davis had rejected his application to medical school in lieu of 
less qualified black applicants who were perceived to be 
―disadvantaged.‖281 Noting that ―[t]he concept of ‗discrimination‘ . . . is 
susceptible of varying interpretations,‖ Justice Powell—a native of 
Richmond, Virginia—made the remarkable claim that it was impossible to 
determine whether blacks had suffered any more ―societal injury‖ or 
―societal discrimination‖ than whites.282 Indeed, whites themselves 
constituted a conglomeration of ―various minority groups,‖ argued Justice 
Powell, including ―Celtic Irishmen,‖ ―Austrian resident aliens,‖ and 
―white Anglo-Saxon Protestants,‖ many of whom ―can lay claim to a 
history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State.‖283  
At first glance absurd, Justice Powell‘s re-characterization of whites as 
an assemblage of suffering minorities actually echoed claims that white 
southerners—of whom Justice Powell was one—had long made.284 Indeed, 
white suffering became, as we have seen, the crux of segregationist 
arguments about integration and culture.
285
 In a manner that dovetailed 
nicely with these arguments, Justice Powell brokered a compromise that 
effectively shut the door on making ―societal discrimination‖ a 
constitutional priority, turning instead to the cultural frame of diversity as 
a preferred category of constitutional analysis.
286
 Here, Justice Powell 
scored points with liberals even as he revivified longstanding 
segregationist claims that blacks and whites were fundamentally, 
culturally different.
287
 Not only did blacks possess different ―ideas,‖ 
posited Justice Powell, but they also possessed different ―mores,‖288 a 
clear allusion to the types of cultural arguments that James Jackson 
Kilpatrick and other segregationists had made since the 1950s. Though 
Justice Powell had disagreed with Kilpatrick‘s endorsement of 
interposition in 1956,
289
 he canonized the discourse of race and culture in 
1978, a move that was not lost on veterans of civil rights like Justice 
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Marshall. ―[I]t is more than a little ironic,‖ argued Justice Marshall in his 
dissenting opinion in Bakke, ―that, after several hundred years of class-
based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a 
class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible.‖290 Equating 
Justice Powell‘s opinion in Bakke to Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Marshall 
lamented, ―I fear that we have come full circle. After the Civil War . . . 
[t]his Court in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the 
movement toward complete equality. . . . Now, we have this Court again 
stepping in, this time to stop affirmative-action programs . . . .‖291  
CONCLUSION 
Massive resistance comprised only one aspect of the South‘s struggle 
against civil rights in the 1950s and 60s. More insidious was a campaign 
rooted in notions of sexual morality and culture, a struggle that invoked 
seemingly unrelated discursive constructs of family, marriage, 
illegitimacy, and even pornography. State regulations of such constructs 
followed, as public officials struggled to perpetuate Jim Crow in facially 
neutral ways while working to build a constitutional coalition with moral 
conservatives in the North and West. Cognizant of such discursive moves, 
civil rights activists responded, deliberately engaging segregationists on 
explicitly cultural terrain. As a result, the activists forced concessions from 
architects of interposition like James Jackson Kilpatrick—who abandoned 
massive resistance in favor of tacit endorsements of black rights.  
Yet, even as segregationists jettisoned defiance, so too did they 
intensify discursive invocations of culture to steal the movement‘s moral 
high ground. Hence, by 1960, Kilpatrick had embarked on a crusade 
against pornography that, by 1965, evolved into a full-scale assault on the 
black family—an assault joined by conservatives across the country in the 
aftermath of the Watts riots. By recovering such discursive moves, we 
catch a glimpse of previously unrecognized ―processes of constitutional 
decision-making,‖ particularly efforts to restrain the Court by building 
popular conservative coalitions. Meanwhile, we gain a stark look at the 
fundamental ways in which constitutional rights are themselves culturally 
contingent, dependent on variables that have little to do with legal 
precedent, litigation strategies, or courts.  
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